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Abstract. This article describes psychologies of inevitability and their foundations pertaining to nuclear 
weapons and weapons of mass destruction. 
 
During the Cold War, United States (US) national security officials labeled as "hawks" cited the gospel of 
a domino theory. In its most radical incarnation, the theory impelled the dire necessity to not only 
contain but roll back any Communist initiative anywhere at any time. The consequence of not doing this 
would be a succession of successful Communist initiatives (one domino falling after another) eventually 
leading to "world victory"--today it would be global victory--for Communism. Often implied in this 
theoretical take on the world were other inevitabilities: e.g., (1) uncontesting an initiative or success 
always led to a detriment in one's other-perceived prestige and formidability and (2) following any 
cooperative venture with a Communist entity always led to others perceiving one to be weak. One 
upshot of this theory was the seemingly necessary, inevitable, and disastrous policy decision for the US 
Government (USG) to significantly engage Communist forces in Vietnam. 
 
Nowadays, it is a segment of opponents of USG national security officials being accused of setting 
dominoes in motion. These opponents of USG initiatives for ballistic missile defense--both theatre and 
national--claim that decisions to develop and field such defenses will inevitability lead other nuclear 
powers to increase the number and quality of their own nuclear weapons. These opponents also claim 
that the USG initiatives also will inevitability lead to non-nuclear political entities with and without 
chemical and biological warfare assets developing and/or upgrading missile-borne threats before 
ballistic missile defense is fully fielded. As well, they claim that the initiatives will fatally harm USG 
relations with allies--this last assertion already becoming disconfirmed by the ongoing discourse of 
public diplomacy. 
 
One might posit that domino theories possess and retain part of their attraction by their ready 
resolution of an alternative nexus of theories suggesting an unpredictable and even meaningless world. 
Unfortunately, such terror management often begets terror through instigating attack, defending no 
defense against attack, or other problematic consequences. And so les jeux sont fait. (See Bosman, J. 
(1987). Persuasive effects of political metaphors. Metaphor & Symbolic Activity, 2, 97-113; Glad, B., & 
Taber, C.S. (1990). Images, learning, and the decision to use force: The domino theory of the United 
States. In B. Glad (Ed.). Psychological dimensions of war. (pp. 56-81).Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage 
Publications, Inc; Gordon, M.R. (March 19, 2001). Bush is due to meet Chinese on crucial Issues. The 
New York Times, pp. A1; A8; Kanwisher, N. (1989). Cognitive heuristics and American security policy. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33, 652-675; Mio, J.S. (1997). Metaphor and politics. Metaphor & Symbol, 
12, 113-133; Shimko, K.L. (1994). Metaphors and foreign policy decision-making. Political Psychology, 
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